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Introduction

Developments at the housing market can have an enormous influence on the business cycle of a country. Housing crises usually go hand in hand with a long lasting recession and a considerable loss in output. 1 
Review of Literature
The role of asset prices and in particular of real house prices in the business cycle is subject of several studies. 2 Overall, they conclude that a strong decline in asset prices is usually followed by a severe economic downturn in affected countries. Closely related to our historical comparison in Section 3 is a study of the International Monetary Fund (IMF 2003) , which evaluates the effects of boom and busts at the stock and housing market with a dataset defines 25 percent of the most severe price decreases as busts. 3 The typical development of important macroeconomic variables indicates that busts at the housing market are followed by recessions with more severe consequences-on average-than busts at the stock market.
Accordingly to the same study, two years after the outbreak of a housing crisis, output is at about eight percent below the level that could have been reached without a housing crisis. A study of Ahearne et al. (2005) is closely related to this approach. They assess the average business cycle pattern after a house price peak, which is defined as a centred six-year high.
The authors conclude that declines in house prices go hand in hand with recessions, turning the output gap negative for more than five years on average. Several other related papers confirm these results. For instance, Jonung et al. (2006) find that a strong decline in asset prices has usually long-lasting negative effects on GDP growth and the output gap.
Independently, Detken and Smets (2004) analyze the behaviour of several macroeconomic variables before, during and after an asset price boom. They show that usually a boom is followed by a serious slow down of economic activity. Moreover, booms causing an above average loss of output usually come along with an above average asset price increase, before the boom and a stronger price decline afterwards. Bordo and Jeanne (2002) regard boom and busts at asset and housing markets as a considerable deviation of prices from their average development measured by the three year mean. According to their study, boom and bust cycles occur more frequently at housing than at asset markets. Moreover, after a boom at the housing market, the output gap drops by five percentage points on average within a three year span. In a separate study with a slightly different focus, Reinhardt and Rogoff (2008) investigate the implications of 18 banking crises in industrial countries. They conclude that banking crises are frequently preceded by significant price increases at the housing markets.
GDP growth usually slows prior to the crisis and remains weak for more than two years. The 
Methodology for Detecting Housing Crises
In current literature two methods are basically engaged for identifying housing crises. One is based on deviations from the trend of house prices, while the other one seeks for turning points in price movements and regards strong price declines as crises. In the following we draw on an approach related to the latter by setting two criteria to define a housing crisis.
Namely, the start of a housing crisis is defined as the peak of houses prices within a rolling window of eight years, followed by a price decline from the peak of at least 7. (Dées und Di Mauro et. al 2007) and international long-run relationships (Dées and Holy et al. 2007) . 5 The dataset consists of data for Great Britain, Canada, Spain, Australia, Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark, Norway, Finland and Ireland and was kindly provided by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). Quarterly house prices for France and the Unites States as well as land prices in Japan were added from national sources (see Appendix A). To compare historical crises with the current situation in different countries, it is necessary to detect starting points of housing crises or at least turning points of the price development.
In this study we consider the following four countries: United States, Great Britain, Spain and 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 3.5
4.5
5.5
France 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 3.5
United States 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 3.5
United Kingdom 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 3.5
Canada 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 3.5
Spain 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 3.5
Australia 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 3.5
Netherlands 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 3.5
Belgium 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 3.5
Sweden 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 3.5
Switzerland 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 3.5
Denmark 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 3.5
Norway 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 3.5
Finland 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 3.5
Ireland 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 3. On a yearly basis GDP growth reaches its bottom in the second year after the price peak with an average growth rate of 0.1 percent (Table 1) . This is far below the average growth rate of all considered countries, which amounts to 2.0 percent. With -1.1 percent, the output gap reaches its lowest value in the second and third year of the crisis. Additionally, the results suggest that an increase in house price previous to a crisis could stimulate the economy and contributes to an upswing ahead of the crisis, since the output gap is increasing notably before the crisis. 10 The monetary and financial indicators react significantly on a housing crisis as well. On average real house prices deteriorate sharply at the beginning of a housing crisis ( Figure 5 ), even more than is induced by the criteria that is employed to define a housing crisis. Furthermore, share prices depreciate considerably with the start of a housing crisis ( Figure 6 ). They drop by 15 percent on average within the first year. The volatility seems to increase significantly, as the crisis surges. The short-run real interest rate starts to rise roughly two years before house prices reach their peak (Figure 7 ).
One explanation behind could be that central banks embark on tightening monetary policy to dampen a boom, which was to some extent induced by rising house prices. Right after the turning point, when the crisis becomes visible, monetary policy is eased.
____________________ 10 While the output gap is a good measure to capture the dynamics of the business cycle, it is not appropriate to calculate the costs of a housing crisis compared with the gains of a housing boom that usually takes place before the crisis. It is because for a longer time span by definition the output gap adds up to zero and thus is biased to the result of no costs. The three European countries show a declining output gap after the price peak, even though the peak is not as pronounced as in typical crises. 11 In the United States, the output gap
The output gap was calculated as the deviation from a HP filter trend extracted with a value for lambda of 1600. Since the trend is calculated as a moving average the HP filter has for the most recent data an end-point bias so that the calculated trend can be revised considerably the more data are available. To dampen this effect GDP growth was forecasted for eight quarters with specifically adjusted autoregressive models for each country. If GDP growth is below the forecast, what seems to be reasonable if we assume that all these countries face a housing crisis, the trend for the last quarters will be then revised downwards, which means at the same time that the output gap before the crisis will be revised upwards and thus would correspond even better with the historical pattern. Private consumption and business investment develop a similar pattern to the GDP growth.
In the three European countries, a sharp decline in line with the historical experience can be observed, whereas consumption growth in the United States develops better than in an average housing crisis. In contrast, residential investment decreases much sharper in the United States, when compared to previous crises. The exaggeration in the subprime segment could play a considerable role here, which should have led to higher residential investment growth prior to the crisis and thus potentially to a stronger correction in the housing sector afterwards. In case of the European counterparts, the deviation of residential investment from its trend is rather flat, when compared to a typical crisis. Nevertheless, recently residential investment has fallen in all of these countries.
The increase in real interest rates starts in all of our four underlying countries about two years prior to the price peak. In the Unites States, real interest rate begins to decline four quarters after the price peak and turns negative after two years. In the European countries real interest rates fall with the beginning of the crisis. However, this is mainly due to the commodity price hike at that time. Moreover, the nominal interest rates start to decline not before the fourth quarter 2008 in these countries. In the United States, Spain and France we can also observe long-lasting phases of very low or even negative real interest rates before the price peak, but also in the United Kingdom real interest rates were relative accommodative in the pre-crisis phase. This indicates a close relationship between house prices and monetary conditions, which seems to support price increases before a crisis and contribute to the ending of the housing boom. Share prices decreased sharply in all four countries in the last quarters in line with the experience during historical housing crises.
International Transmission Mechanisms of Housing Crises
A simultaneous economic slowdown in several important industrial countries should have significant negative transmission effects on other countries. The historical comparison in ____________________ 12 Since the crisis started much earlier in the United States already more data are available and the potential for a revision of the output gap around the price peak is much smaller than for the other countries. All in all it is unlikely that we ex post will observe a similar output gap pattern for the United States compared with a typical housing crisis.
Section 3 indicates that the United States, firstly, revealed a different business cycle pattern compared to a typical historical crisis and secondly, that the impact of the crisis is expected to bottoms out in 2009. Therefore, to estimate the international transmission effects of the recent housing crises, we focus only on the three European countries, namely the United Kingdom, Spain and France. For our analysis of the transmission effects we apply a global vector autoregressive model and assume that each of these three countries will face an average housing crisis, with respect to GDP growth.
International Business Cycle Model
Due to lack of a global model that incorporates the housing market explicitly and to our focus on GDP growth rather than the detailed channels of transmission, we draw on a multicountry-model, according to Abeysinghe and Forbes (2001) , that explains domestic GDP growth t y Δ by means of own lags and the export-weighted foreign GDP growth * Δ t y . The implicit assumption is that international transmission works mainly through the trade channel, while domestic economic activity can be explained adequately by an autoregressive process.
The economy of each country in the model is described by two equations: (1)
where l D in equation (1) describes the deterministic part of the equation and can consist of a constant and a trend term. For equation (1), foreign economic activity is allowed to influence domestic GDP growth contemporaneously. Equation (2) allows to summarize GDP growth of all foreign countries via the individual export weights t ik g , into one variable for the perspective of country i . This results in a feasible model with respect to the number of parameters that have to be estimated. The export weights are calculated as average over the last four quarters such that short-term fluctuations do not influence the results, respectively. 13 The United States are the only country assumed to be a big open economy. Thus, GDP growth ____________________ 13 The weights are assumed to be exogenous.
is not allowed to be affected contemporaneously by the foreign variable. Under the assumption that each of the other countries is a small open economy, the contemporaneous foreign variable in equation (1) 
Simulation Method
For the simulation of the transmission effects of a housing crisis in the United Kingdom, Spain and France on other countries, we compare a baseline scenario to a crisis scenario. The consequences of a housing crisis in the three countries for other countries are then measured by impulse response functions, calculated as the difference of GDP growth in both scenarios.
The baseline scenario is the unconditional model forecast, which converges to the growth rate of potential output after some quarters (Figure 8 ). In the case of the crisis scenario, we assume that the GDP growth of the three countries will develop as during a typical housing crisisderived in Section 3 -and then forecast GDP growth in the other countries conditionally on this assumption.
Many housing crises took place in the seventies and eighties of the last century and therefore under different macroeconomic conditions. Most notably, the trend growth rates in this period were usually higher such that the average GDP growth of a historical housing crisis could be still higher than the forecast of GDP growth in the baseline scenario. To circumvent this problem we calculate GDP growth for the three countries in the crisis scenario as the change of the output gap during a historical housing crisis ("implicit shocks") added to the baseline forecast. This method ensures a reasonable replication of the typical ____________________ 14 The countries are Germany, France, Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, Portugal, Finland, Italy, Spain, Greece, United States, United Kingdom, Japan, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, South Africa, South Korea, Israel, Turkey, Singapore and Mexico. 15 The model selection method deletes, based on the complete model with all lags, the variable with the smallest significance level until all remaining variables are significant at the ten percent level. All included deterministic terms are structurally stable at the five percent level. We test for autocorrelation in the first, second, fourth and eighth lag of the residuals. The country equation for Greece is allowed to include the maximum number of eight lags to ensure that the residuals are free of autocorrelation. For the United Kingdom autocorrelation is detected for the eighth lag. All other residuals are free of autocorrelation. Table 2 provides an overview of the changes in GDP growth due to the housing crisis in the three underlying countries on an annual basis. The overall transmission effect can be divided and Germany (0.6 percentage points) still loose a considerable amount of growth, the negative international transmission effects to other countries like Italy or Belgium already bottoms out.
Again, non-European countries are usually affected to a much smaller extent. Exceptions are Japan, South Africa and Singapore, whereas the results on a quarterly basis have shown that the effects on Singapore are quiet uncertain.
Conclusion
After the United States, also other countries find themselves in a housing crisis or probably slide into one. In terms of international economic influence, Great Britain, Spain and France are the most prominent countries of those. The historical comparison illustrates that a longlasting economic downturn is presumable, once a country faces a housing crisis. On average, a housing crisis has the most severe effects in the first two years and particularly between the fifth and the seventh quarter after the house prices have reached their peak. 
